September 19, 2007
Research Memo
Can the U.S. Influence Political Progress in Iraq?
*Judith S. Yaphe
Summary:
Regardless of the debate over the success or failure of the military surge in Iraq, Americans and Iraqis agree on one key point: military operations alone are insufficient to quell the insurgencies and keep Iraq intact. A political surge is essential, and it can only be delivered by Iraqis. Yet, as the military surge reaches its peak and despite U.S. pressure to enact benchmark legislation, the Iraqi government led by Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki continues to fail to show progress toward a political solution. If the political stalemate in Baghdad were not enough, Iraq in the months ahead will face three other potentially explosive political events: provincial elections, a controversial census, and a referendum to determine who will govern Kirkuk.
What can the U.S. do to restore confidence in its ability to end the violence and regain a level of cooperation? More to the point, what can the U.S. do to bolster confidence in the central government in Baghdad, shore up its sagging influence, and enhance its ability to establish and maintain a stable, secure, and inclusive Iraq, despite sagging U.S. influence? The U.S. can:
Background
With the collapse of the Ba'thist government in 2003, the United States appeared to be in a position to shape the country's political direction and establish a civil society. Iraq had no history of sectarian warfare but it had a long tradition of political violence. At first, communal unease was masked by the need of Kurd and Arab, Sunni and Shi'a to establish bases of power and lines of authority in the nascent political process. Despite efforts by Sunni extremists and renegade Ba'thists to provoke violence and civil war, Iraq was able to avoid religiously motivated communal warfare. At that moment, America's ability to influence nation-building and create a more equitable and secure country was at its greatest.
The moment was brief. As American leverage over Iraq's political future waned, Iraqi factions that had been long isolated and excluded from power assumed dominant roles in the succeeding provisional governments and proceeded to deconstruct Iraqi politics, society, and security. Iraq today is a country divided by competing identities and loyalties. Some Iraqis find their primary identity in their ethnic origins-Kurds seeking to right historic wrongs through maximalist demands for territory and wealth, Arabs and Turkmen trying in response to defend their own rights to land and resources. Others identify themselves primarily according to religious sect-Sunnis trying to re-establish their historical political dominance, Shi'a determined to enjoy their new-found status as the majority group in a newly democratic country.
Iraq is not in the midst of a single insurgency focused simply on ending American occupation, nor is it enmeshed in a sectarian civil war in which one clearly defined religious faction makes war on another over doctrinal differences. Instead, struggles over national identity and political power lie at the heart of the issue. Iraq is experiencing a complicated set of civil wars and power struggles over conflicting visions of identity and reality. Much of the political conflict and social violence is waged in sectarian terms, but under the façade of religion Shi'a are fighting Shi'a, Sunnis are battling Sunnis, Sunni Turkmen are fighting Shi'a Turkmen, and criminals and opportunists are using the instability to enrich themselves and empower warlords. The parties to the struggle are tribal leaders, militia chiefs, politicized clerics, former government and military officials, Mafia-style warlords, criminals, and individuals who spent long years in exile.
In the midst of this multi-faceted conflict, Iraqis are under constant siege from poverty, unemployment, a dysfunctional government, corrupt political leaders, and vicious militias determined to enforce their peculiar combination of sectarian purity and material self-aggrandizement. At the same time, the Maliki government is under pressure from the U.S. government and politicians to show progress on U.S.-established political benchmarks, including revision of the Constitution and enactment of laws on control of the country's oil resources, de-Ba'thification, and national reconciliation. The problem is that the political system upon which all these demands are being levied has not yet completed the painful process upon which the country embarked in April 2003: the establishment of a new modus operandi for the governance of Iraq based on a lowest common denominator vision of what kind of country Iraq is going to be. Instead, more than four years after the collapse of Saddam Husayn's regime, all the key contenders are still battling for power in much the same way that Saddam did.
As a result, the Shi'a factions that dominate the government in Baghdad and their Kurdish allies continue to balk at making political concessions that could undermine their new-found positions of power. This includes refusal to adopt inclusive political practices or end the broad application of de-Ba'thification laws. Rather than creating accountable ministries staffed by apolitical technocrats and experts, they find it necessary to ensure control by embedding family, friends, and clients in powerful (and lucrative) posts. While they have promised cooperation with American and coalition forces in the war on al-Qaida and other terrorist elements, in reality they define "terrorists" as their political or tribal opponents and the militias those opponents control.
Why has the Political Surge Failed?
Iraq's political leaders' have welcomed the military surge. However, they resent what they view to be unwarranted intrusion into sovereign political issues. For these Iraqis, the U.S. debate over when-not if-the U.S. should withdraw and benchmarks Iraq's National Assembly must pass, are intrusive, interventionist, and relevant only for American political consumption, not to the life-or-death struggle for power in Iraq. The resentment is fueling tensions between Iraqis and Americans and further undermining U.S. influence in Iraq and the region. No amount of U.S. pressure seems capable of influencing Iraqi political leaders, who are more absorbed with struggling for political power and local control than with pleasing the United States.
The lack of progress has other sources. Part lies in the newly invented political system and its constitution, which was crafted in haste in 2005. Political authority was decentralized, national power was limited, and provincial, sectarian, and ethnic interests consolidated. Identity shaped by a strong sense of ethnicity, religious sect, and victimization define loyalty for many in Iraq. Part of the problem lies in the politicians and factions trying to assert control over territory, people, and wealth. Their self-absorption has left the government of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki unable to curb sectarian strife, establish a modicum of security, win political consensus on any issue, or deliver the goods and services desperately needed by the Iraqi people.
And, part of the problem lies in the engrained resentment in Baghdad over U.S. efforts to direct political decisions and security operations. Occupied by Turks, British, and Americans, Iraqis resent foreign intervention in their politics. Moreover, U.S. failure to meet Iraqi expectations that it would deliver everything from democratic institutions to jobs, foreign investment, electricity, and peace caused many Iraqis to lose confidence in American intentions and capabilities.
What Could Change This Picture?
Iraq may be at risk of failing as a state, but it is not there yet. Nor do Iraq's new political elites have any interest in committing national suicide. What could restore their willingness to cooperate and a modicum of confidence in the United States, and boost its influence.
What Can the U.S. Do?
There is little consensus between policy advocates in either the United States or Iraq on what can or cannot work in Iraq. Some policy analysts argue that the U.S. should abandon a strategy based on maintaining the central government in Baghdad for a province-centric, locally-based strategy that focuses on building local community capacity rather than strengthening central government authority. Others urge re-inventing a strong, central governing authority in Baghdad rather than relying on a weak, decentralized political system that lacks the authority or will to act in defense of the nation.
Another debate focuses on the question of whether the United States should continue to work with Iraq's elected government, cultivate new alliances with tribes or factions that are security-focused and anti-Iranian, or support replacement of Maliki's government. A policy of cultivating new allies raises a number of practical questions: Who can the U.S. trust? How do you win over these new allies? Do you arm them and assist them in their inter-tribal, clan, ethnic or sectarian battles? Will tilting towards specific groups because of their sectarian identification or mutual antipathy for Iran help or harm the U.S. in the longer term? Can one buy a tribe or only rent one? On the other hand, continuing to work through the elected central government, regardless of who leads it, implies U.S. confidence that the government and a new Iraqi army can rise to defend the interests of Iraq as a whole and not just those of a sectarian or ethnic subset of the Iraqi people. Is the creation of such a government and force, with the necessary public credibility, possible? Not in the short term. Creation of a democratic culture and a government and armed forces willing to act constitutionally takes time and training. The decisions and actions of Iraq's current leaders reflect their long years as leaders of opposition movements in exile rather than their brief roles as politicians in the brief years since Saddam's long and violent rule ended.
While outsiders debate the next stages of U.S. policy in Iraq, the insurgencies continue and local sectarian and ethnic leaders and their militias grow in influence and strength. The U.S. by itself lacks the resources necessary to build national political, military and security institutions and economic infrastructure and at the same time invest in local neighborhood and community-building. Iraq needs technical experts in economic reconstruction, agriculture, and a wide range of skills to support the reconstruction efforts already underway in many regions. To sustain these efforts and initiate new programs aimed at building security, the U.S. will need to enlist the resources of the international community as well as the skills of Iraq's diverse populations. One thing is clear. The U.S. will not again enjoy the kind of confidence or influence it possessed in the first days after Iraq's liberation. It will need to pick its way carefully through the dangerous zones of Iraqi politics and security. U.S. political and military leaders need to:
A Cautionary Note
Iraqis warn that a U.S. military withdrawal, especially a precipitous one, will create a security vacuum that religious extremists, terrorists, and possibly some neighbors will rush in to fill. Their neighbors agree that the result will be a worse chaos than has been witnessed to date. They say anticipation of a U.S military withdrawal is already encouraging Iraqi factions, militias, and terrorists to prepare for the day after we leave.
Effective governance may still be possible. As Iraqi politics and politicians mature, they may see the benefits to be gained from thinking nationally, and not merely factionally. While the major groups-Kurds, Shi'a factions, and Sunni parties-issue demands they characterize as non-negotiable, these may in fact be maximalist bargaining positions. There may yet be room for compromise, even over the critical issues of oil exploitation and revenue distribution, federalism, and the role of Islam in governance. The fate of Kirkuk and the repeal of the de-Ba'thification law appear more problematic, but even in these areas there have been signs of willingness to compromise on the margins and where factional interests overlap.
True integration of the armed forces is probably not yet feasible. Popular perceptions of an ethnically and religiously mixed military are highly polarized. Sunnis see the army as a Shi'a dominated, illegitimate occupying force, while Shi'a Arabs and Kurds profess fear if alleged ex-Ba'thists (meaning Sunni Arab officers who served in Saddam's army) return. Iraqis say they prefer regional militias under local control, but local control is an ambiguous concept in regions where mixed populations live and ethnic cleansing conducted by militias in uniform is a reality. There is little public confidence in the Interior and Intelligence Ministries or the police, all of which are militia-led and uncontrollable. Given the violence perpetrated by Shi'a militias in police uniforms, Sunnis in military leadership positions, and the factional infighting in the Interior and Intelligence Ministries, it is difficult to predict when and how these instruments of national power can gain legitimacy and respect. Equally worrisome are indications that officers and civilians trained in or by the U.S. are being marginalized and, in some cases, purged from the Defense Ministry.
Iraq is at a defining moment in its history. Can this state, which was created by imperial artifice after World War I, survive its multiple and overlapping insurgencies, the conflicting visions of what it means to be Iraqi, and the competing egos of its new political leaders? How these contradictions are resolved will determine whether Iraq hangs together as a single state, finds a relatively peaceful equilibrium in what some call a "soft partition," or violently collapses at the cost of the ultimate destruction of the Iraqi state and identity.
* Dr. Yaphe is Distinguished Research Fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. Observations and analysis in this memo are hers and do not reflect the views of the University, the Department of Defense, or any other government agency.