• lifting restrictions that are the source of resentment and protest;
• announcing an end to all "patriotic education" programs;
• repealing new laws requiring government approval of all lamas;
• affirming that minors should be able to engage in religious education at any age;
• ensuring safe passage for Tibetans traveling to Nepal or India;
• announcing that devotion to the Dalai Lama, including displaying and venerating his picture, is not a criminal act; and
• unconditionally releasing all detained monks and nuns.

• If attending the Opening Ceremonies or any of the Olympic games in Beijing, President Bush should request to meet with prisoners and persons detained by the state because of their exercise or advocacy of freedom of religion and related human rights. President Bush should also attend an "unregistered" church to underline the Chinese government's violations of religious freedom through its efforts to control faith.
• The U.S. government should seek unrestricted access to Tibetan regions to assess the situation and visit imprisoned monks.
• In order to raise the profile of religious freedom and related human rights promotion through the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing, the Commission has urged the U.S. Congress to

• within funds appropriated for the security of U.S. citizens in Beijing during the 2008 Olympic Games, allocate sufficient resources to ensure that training and related information materials include content that:
  • instructs security officials, Olympic spectators, and athletes regarding China's commitments to uphold for all visitors certain internationally recognized human rights standards during the Olympic Games; and
  • informs U.S. citizens, participants, and spectators at the Olympic games of their rights protected under international law and identifies problem areas they may encounter with Chinese authorities, relating to the freedoms of expression, religion or belief, assembly, and association, including information on Chinese law and recent human rights practices of the Chinese government on these issues; and
• in order to promote a free and open environment, in concert with the principles of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and the standards of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, designate appropriate funding to independent human rights organizations to monitor and report on human rights conditions during the summer games to ensure that the Chinese government is in compliance with relevant commitments made to the IOC to uphold human rights and international standards during the Summer Olympics.

September 19, 2007

• Thank you for asking me to appear. I have been asked today to discuss primarily the effects of sectarian violence on religious freedom and human rights, with particular attention to the Shiite perspective and Shiite-on-Shiite violence in Baghdad and in southern Iraq.
• I note with interest that the September 2007 Defense Department report on Iraqi stability, which was published yesterday, says that "The security environment in southern Iraq took a notable turn for the worse in August." This assessment clearly tracks with much of the press reporting out of the Shiite areas of Iraq over the past few months. It is clear that intra-Shiite tensions are increasing, and that Shiite inhabitants of Iraq can no longer, as they have for the past several years, take security "for granted." High levels of violence in Iraq are no longer confined to Sunni areas or to areas where Sunnis and Shiites live closely together.
• It is likely that the drawdown of multi-national forces in southern Iraq is a contributing factor to the increased violence we are seeing. Britain has now reduced its force from 7,100 to about 5,200 in the Basra area, with plans to reduce to 5,000 by the end of the year. In August 2007, Britain abandoned its last base in the city itself, Basra palace, and is now concentrated at the local airport.
• The various Shiite factions appear to be engaging in, or at the very least preparing for, an all-out scramble for power. Broadly drawn, the fighting is between what I call the "insurgent" Shiites typified by the Mahdi Army (Jaysh al-Mahdi, JAM) of Moqtada Al Sadr, and the "incumbent" Shiites of the dominant political parties in southern Iraq, particularly the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI). The "incumbent" Shiites have professional party organizations and well developed political structures. ISCI was well positioned after the fall of Saddam Hussein in April 2003, and it participated in the provincial elections of January 2005. The less well organized Sadr faction did not compete aggressively in all the Shiite provinces of the south, and found itself in the minority on almost all the provincial councils of southern Iraq.
• In general, Sadr's lower class Shiite constituents want the benefits of the Iraqi state to accrue to them in the form of generous social welfare payments, subsidies, and government jobs. ISCI and its national ally, the Da'wa Party of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, tend to represent more affluent Shiites who want economic growth and free trade rather than government involvement in the economy.
• The "incumbent" Shiite parties are generally closer to Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani than are the "insurgent" Shiite parties. This is because Sistani is generally mainstream and from the "quietist" school of Shiite Islam rather than the "vocal" school. Sistani is revered as the leading theologian by followers of both ISCI and the Sadr faction, but the Sadrists believe that Sistani's quietism does not necessarily serve their interests because he tends to support the status quo.
• ISCI controls a militia of an estimated 20,000 called the Badr Brigades, now renamed the Badr Organization. The Badr forces, thanks to the 2005-2006 tenure of ISCI senior official Bayan Jabr as Interior Minister, have essentially, by all accounts, taken over the Ministry of Interior and much of the police administrative apparatus. Badr loyalists dominate the 26,000 member National Police, which the congressionally-mandated "Jones Commission" on the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) said in September 2007 needs to be completely disbanded and reorganized because of its sectarianism.
• This balance of forces explains some of the recent fighting seen in several southern cities. For example, there has been nearly continuous fighting between the JAM and the Badr-dominated Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) in the city of Diwaniyah (Qadisiyah Province) and Nassiriyah (Dhi Qar Province). In August 2007, the provincial governors of Qadisiyah and another Shiite southern province, Muthanna - both ISCI members - were assassinated within a week of each other. According to the Defense Department report cited previously, both governors had been "pushing back" against JAM "expansion and control."
• An even starker example of the degree to which this infighting has spilled over into the public arena came on August 28, when fighting between the JAM and the ISF (purportedly mostly Badr fighters within the ISF) in the holy city of Karbala caused the death of more than 50 persons, mostly ISF and JAM fighters. However, the fighting interrupted a Shiite celebration (the birth of the 12th Imam) and many of the Shiite celebrants were ordered out of the city.
• There are few Sunnis in southern Iraq and therefore Sunni - Shiite conflict is not a major feature in the south. However, Shiite militias in the south have retaliated for alleged Sunni atrocities elsewhere in Iraq. For example, in June 2007, militants blew up two Sunni mosques in Basra, apparently in retaliation for the June 13, 2007 destruction of two remaining minarets at the Askariya Shrine in Samarra, which is in a mostly Sunni province north of Baghdad. Such actions have, by many accounts, caused the few Sunnis that were in Basra to flee for central Iraq, including Baghdad, where more Sunnis are concentrated.
• The city of Basra has complications even beyond those of Karbala, Diwaniyah, Nassiriyah, Amarah, and others. Basra is Iraq's main oil producing region and the point of export for about 80% of Iraq's total oil exports. In Basra, with power comes the ability to divert oil exports, smuggle them out, and pocket the proceeds. In Basra, there is yet another Shiite party that is competing for influence - the Fadilah, or Islamic Virtue, Party. Fadilah is led by Ayatollah Mohammad Yacoubi, who was an aide to Moqtada Al Sadr's father but then was pushed out of the Sadrist movement when Moqtada moved to take it over after his father's death in 1999. At the national level, Fadilah and the Sadr trend are usually aligned against the "incumbent" Shiite parties because both Sadr and Fadilah represent lower class constituents. Both have recently pulled out of the broad "United Iraqi Alliance" that is dominated by the incumbent Shiite factions. However, in Basra, Sadr and Fadilah are competitors because of the vast assets up for grabs there. Fadilah has 12 of the 40 Basra province seats; ISCI controls 21 seats, leaving Sadr with very little representation on the provincial council. In April 2007, the Sadrists conducted protests in Basra to try to persuade the provincial governor, Mohammad Waili, who is a Fadilah member, to resign, a campaign that is continuing.
• A Christian Science Monitor story of September 17 describes Basra as basically carved up among Shiite militias. The JAM is said to be very strong among the police force, and the Badr militia is said to have its loyalists heavily present in the Basra customs service that oversees trade between Iran and Iraq. Fadilah, which is very strong among the oil worker sector in Basra, controls the 15,000 person Facilities Protection Service (FPS) contingent that guards the oil infrastructure there. Another pro-Iranian militia is said to be operating in the city - Thar Allah, or God's Revenge, which grew out of a Shiite guerrilla group operating against Saddam Hussein from the marsh border areas.
• The internecine fighting among Shiite factions does not appear to characterize the situation in Baghdad. According to the September 2007 DoD "Measuring Stability" report, the Sadr faction-dominated district of Baghdad called "Sadr City" is "the most stable in terms of ethno-sectarian attacks." "However, this area continues to provide support for JAM operatives who use the area for planning, logistics, and other support activities and as a base from which to launch attacks on the International Zone and neighboring areas."

Effects of Militia Influence and Control. Numerous accounts from visitors to Iraq show how Iraqi social and political life has been affected by the strength of militias in the south. Some examples of the growing Islamization of Basra and surrounding areas are contained in the State Department's human rights country report on Iraq for 2006, released on March 6, 2007, as well as the International Religious Freedom Report for 2007, released just a few days ago. Similar information was presented in a June 2007 study by the International Crisis Group.1 International Crisis Group. Where is Iraq Heading? Lessons from Basra. June 25, 2007. 1 According to the reports, professors at Basra University who were considered secular received written threats and demands to depart Basra. During 2006, a series of killings targeted professors in Basra (as well as Baghdad). The report also says there were "Serious reports of torture and killings leveled at [the Ministry of Interior's] Serious Crime Unit detention facility in Basra...." Basra's education director has required all females in the schools to cover their heads.

Although not limiting its discussion to Basra, the reports present trends in gender discrimination. In particular, according to the State Department human rights report:

in practice conservative societal standards impeded women's abilities to exercise their rights. Throughout the country, women reported increasing pressure to wear veils. Many reported the presence of flyers in their neighborhoods threatening women who refused. Women were targeted for undertaking normal activities, such as driving a car, talking on a cell phone, and wearing trousers, in an effort to force them to remain at home, wear veils, and adhere to a very conservative interpretation of Islam. In addition to societal pressures, there were several reports of women at government ministries being told to wear a veil or lose their job.

The International Crisis Group report asserts that the health care system has largely come under the control of Shiite Islamists, particularly the Sadrists, who controlled the national health ministry until the resignation of all Sadrists from the cabinet in April 2007. The Islamists have sought to segregate the health care system by gender, with doctors treating only patients of the same gender.

Although the State Department report does not specifically attribute such intimidation to Shiite parties or militias, press reports about Basra have consistently suggested that it is Shiite militiamen, particularly JAM members, that are conducting the intimidation discussed above. Other reports have said that Mahdi and Badr militiamen have beaten students publicly displaying affection and have attacked sellers of alcohol.

The Role of Iran. Most experts believe that Iran is backing many different Shiite factions, not knowing which might emerge on top and wanting influence with all. The one possible exception is Fadilah, which views itself as opposing Iranian influence in Iraq. U.S. military officials have asserted on a number of occasions that Iran is supplying the Shiite militias with sophisticated conventional weaponry, including Explosively Formed Projectiles (EFPs) that are capable of piercing U.S. armored vehicles. Iran's goal is to demonstrate U.S. weakness in Iraq and to ensure Shiite domination of post-Saddam Iraq. In Basra, according to the International Crisis Group report, Iranian intelligence has established a presence in Iran's consulate there, in humanitarian organizations, and in the pro-Iranian political party headquarters.

At the same time, Iran's influence might not be as strong or as organized as some assert. Basra governor Waili has not been forced out of office even though he belongs to Fadilah, which is the least sympathetic to Iran of the Shiite parties there. If Iran's influence were as determinative as some believe, it is reasonable to argue that Iran could, by now, have forced Waili out.

September 19, 2007

Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you for inviting me to this meeting of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom. I'm honored to testify before you today on the plight of refugees in Iraq.

Since the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, violence has grown to an appalling level. The looting of Baghdad immediately after its liberation was a harbinger of the lawlessness which today grips much of the country.

In spite of this chaos, our men and women in uniform have done a superb job in Iraq. They have suffered many casualties, and have born their burden with admirable courage.

But if Americans have suffered, Iraqis have also had their share of tragedy. Iraqi civilians have born the brunt of incredibly brutal violence. Al-Qaeda in Iraq has committed a pantheon of atrocities, from murdering children to the recent atrocity against the Yazidi community.

In addition to Al-Qaeda, faceless sectarian death squads hunt the country. Americans may have grown numb to the daily reports of bodies dumped by the side of the road, or in rivers, or in alleys, but Iraqis haven't. For them, the nightmare is reality.

To escape this violence, millions of Iraqis have left their homes. The UN estimates that more than two million Iraqis have fled the country, and 2.2 million are internally displaced. Over half of those two and a quarter million have recently left since the Samarra mosque bombing in February 2006.

These refugees come from all walks of life, but especially from Iraq's most vulnerable groups. Human-rights organizations estimate that Christians, who constitute less than 3 percent of Iraq's population, make up at least 20 percent of the refugees. Sabaeans, a tiny sect within Iraq, make up 5 percent of refugees. These minorities are often targeted by Islamic extremists for murder, rape, or forced conversion. Unsurprisingly, many choose to leave.

The refugees do not only come from minority populations. Estimates indicate about 45 percent are Sunni, and 25 percent are Shia. Iraqis of every stripe are fearful for their lives. Tragically, the UN states that two to two-and-a-half hundred thousand of these Iraqis are school-age children.

These children and their families have left home for different reasons, but their reasons have a common thread. In a survey by the United Nations, sixty-three percent of Iraqis said they had left their neighborhoods because of direct threats to their lives. Twenty-five percent left because they had been forcibly removed from their homes. These threats are often based on religion.

Sectarian violence is today the leading cause of refugee displacement. The effect has been to segregate Shia Iraqis and Sunni Iraqis, both nationally and locally. In Baghdad, some Sunni neighborhoods are walled off to protect them from the attacks of their countrymen. In the south of Iraq, threats from Shia militias have forced Sunnis to move to the north and west. The Shias from these areas have likewise fled Sunni death squads and Al-Qaeda.

In a front-page article this past Monday, The New York Times described how the sectarian violence and ever-present fear of death have fundamentally changed Iraqis and their society. Mixed marriages have become rare. Many Iraqis leave; and those who stay behind in a mixed neighborhood live constantly on the edge of a knife.

Hatreds lasting a thousand years are difficult to reconcile. Our country, which is a mere 231 years old, has difficulty enough with our old disagreements. We have solved some and continue to wrestle with others.

Nobody, however, has helped us reconcile these conflicts. Americans resolve American problems; and today, Iraqis need to resolve Iraqi problems. US soldiers cannot solve sectarian hatreds.

By some reports, our current strategy, the "troop surge," is making things worse. The Iraqi Red Crescent estimates that as many as 100,000 Iraqis have been leaving their homes since February, at the beginning of the "surge." This is not the fault of our soldiers, but rather a natural fear of more violence.

Nevertheless, it seems like folly to me to use American troops to police Sunni and Shia Iraqis who hate each other. The refugees we see today, in a large part, are due to the Iraqis' inability to resolve this hatred. The mission US troops are on today seems misguided. We certainly need to fight al-Qaeda and train the Iraqi army. We do not need to be trying to force a political compromise that isn't there.

One of the tasks the United States needs to embrace more fully is the responsibility for the suffering of ordinary Iraqis. While we cannot necessarily treat the disease, we can help treat the symptoms.

America owes a debt to those Iraqis who have been affected by the war. We also owe a special debt to those Iraqis who have worked with American forces. To this end, I cosponsored S.1104, a Senate bill to increase the number of Iraqis and Afghans who could be admitted to the United States. That is one step.

A bigger step would be moving to alleviate the overall refugee issue. I have been working with Senator Kennedy to pass S.1651, a bill which would enable Iraqi refugees of special attention (like religious minorities) to be admitted to the United States. It would increase the visas we make available to Iraqis, as well as allow refugees to be directly processed in Iraq.

In a diplomatic cable dated September 7th, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker complained to the State Department about bottlenecks in the refugee process. Among other problems, the ambassador noted that refugees often faced up to a two year delay to enter the US, an unnecessarily long wait. He urged action. I heartily agree.

I know better than many Americans how difficult it is for religious minorities to thrive in this world. It is difficult in the United States. It is far harder in the Middle East. The condition of these minorities in Iraq is thus of special interest to me. If we owe a debt to Iraqis, I hope that this legislation plays a small part in repaying that debt.

Though America may bear overall responsibility, these refugees are not only a concern of the United States. Other countries, willing or not, are involved as well. Iraq's neighbors have perhaps the most pressing concerns about the refugee issues, because these nations often wind paying the bill. Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt have so far borne the brunt of the refugee crisis.

Jordan, which has a population of 6.1 million, hosts up to 750,000 Iraqi refugees. Lebanon, with a population of 3.9 million, hosts between 40,000 and 200,000 Iraqis. Syria, with a population of 19.3 million, supports an estimated 1.2 million refugees. Egypt carries a lesser but still significant burden.

Each of these countries faces significant structural pressures as a result of their decision to support these Iraqis. Jordan, for example, has an estimated 1.8 million Palestinian refugees in addition to the Iraqis. Jordan thus now has the largest refugee-per-capita ratio on earth.

Because of Amman's delicate political situation we must make every effort to ensure that the financial and social strain does not stress Jordanian society, and make similar efforts with the other states.

The final status of externally displaced Iraqis must also be resolved within a reasonable time frame. These refugees' suffering must not be prolonged as a political weapon by their host countries with which to attack enemies. America has a national moral commitment to resolving the Iraqi refugee issue as quickly as possible.

Unfortunately, unconscionable delays have often prevented Iraqis from reaching safety.

The current refugee process requires potential refugees to leave Iraq before registering with United Nations refugee authorities. This journey is long, and especially hazardous.

Once Iraqis reach these authorities in Jordan, Syria, and elsewhere, a fresh purgatory awaits them. They must wait up to 6-8 months to be registered as refugees, and another 6-8 months to be designated as ready for resettlement. They are afterwards referred to the US and other final destination nations. These countries then have their own refugee processing systems, with their own delays.

Meanwhile, Iraqis usually lack access to basic social services. Given the large amount of children, the lack takes on an extra urgency. The NGO Human Rights First noted that America's funding for grossly inadequate. The United States gave $10 million to Jordan in the War on Terror Supplemental for Fiscal Year 2008.

In comparison, the United States gave Jordan $700 million in 2003 to offset the cost of the Iraq war. The United States is also spending $9 billion per month overall on the Iraq war overall.

Surely there is some additional funding available for the men, women, and children who are most affected by the violence in Iraq. It is America's moral duty.

We still have many questions to answer about solutions to the refugee crisis. Should we give economic aid to all countries which harbor refugees, such as Syria, or condition that aid on the treatment Iraqis receive? How can we expedite the relocation of Iraqi refugees? How can we prevent so many Iraqis from having to travel to other countries before they reach sanctuary in the United States and elsewhere? Should we focus our effort within international organizations, such as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and UNICEF, or should we repay our debt bilaterally?

America historically has an honorable record in alleviating the plight of refugees from its wars. After the collapse of South Vietnam, for example, the United States absorbed an estimated 135,000 South Vietnamese refugees. In comparison, between 2003 and mid-2007, fewer than 800 Iraqis were admitted to the United States. Whether our effort is by ourselves, with allies, or with international organizations, more clearly needs to be done.

The plight of religious minorities is nowhere easy. It is most difficult in a war zone, in a region where they are already persecuted. The situation in Iraqis thus a humanitarian hazard of the first concern, particularly for those who bear overall responsibility.

Thank you for your time today. It has been an honor to testify before you.